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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---oooOooo--SHIRLEY W, ADAMS
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

CHARLES W. ADAMS
Defendant and
Respondent.
---oooOooo--BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT
---oooOooo--NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant pursuant
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court in a domestic matter,
based on an Order to Show Cause issued by the Trial Court as to why
the Defendant-Respondent should not be ordered to pay alimony which
has accrued and remains unpaid.

Defendant-Respondent objected to

the Order to Show Cause, requested that the Trial Court terminate
the Defendant-Respondent's alimony obligation and find that PlaintiffAppellant was estopped from claiming any past due alimony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court, in a memorandum decision held that Plaintiff~ppellant

was estopped from claiming alimony against the Defendant-

?espondent except as to any arrearages which had accull'.ulated up to
~arch

1972 and for six months thereafter and that the decree was to
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be modified to reduce alimony to the sum of $1.00 per year.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant prays that the judgment of the Trial
Court be reversed and that this Court direct the Trial Court to
enter its order awarding the back due alimony together with intereo
·r

thereon, to restore the alimony obligation to its former level and'
to award Plaintiff-Appellant reasonable attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on May 13, 1954 and divorced on
March 27, 1970 with the divorce becoming final three months thereafter.

The Divorce Decree was modified on the 16th of June, 1970,'

the 17th of January, 1972 and again at the request of DefendantRespondent on March 31, 1972.

The last modification of the decree

awarded custody of the minor children of the parties to the Defendant-Respondent and terminated the Defendant-Respondent's child
support obligation.
From the date the decree was last modified in Barch 1972 unti:
the time this action was brought in November 1977, the DefendantRespondent never paid any alimony except for the sum of $707.50
which is not a part of this appeal.

(T., 5)

It is undisputed that

the Plaintiff-Appellant did not claim alimony or make any represe~·
tations whatever to Defendant-Respondent with regard to the paymen:
of alimony during that same period of time.

(T.,l2,13,14)

The Trial Court's finding that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred since the date of the last modification
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

and Technology
Act, administered
the Utah Plaintiff-Appellant
State Library.
of the decree Library
wasServices
based
on the
fact bythat
no
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

longer has custody of the minor children and has no obligation
to support them.

(T ,25)
ARGUMENT.
POINT ONE

THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE RAISED AS A
DEFENSE TO PAYMENT OF ALIMONY WHEN THE ONLY RELIANCE BY THE HUSBAND IS UPON THE WIFE'S SILENCE
OR FAILURE TO PURSUE HER CLAIM.
Plaintiff-Appellant assigns as error the statement of the
Trial Court in its Findings of Fact No. 5, that:
"Plaintiff knew or should have known ••• that the
Defendant did not recognize any obligation to pay
alimony, and at that time Plaintiff had a duty to
inform Defendant that she claimed alimony .•• "
Plaintiff-Appellant also assigns as error the Trial Court's Finding
of Fact No. 6 in its entirety and further asserts that not only is
the doctrine of estoppel improperly applied by the Trial Court but
that the arbitrary choice of six months as a -period at which time
the estoppel would begin to run has no basis in law or in fact.
The Trial Court has created a duty which was nonexistent and
which is directly contrary to previous holdings of this Court.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P2d 528, 531 (1943) this
Court stated that in order for the doctrine of estoppel to be
raised successfully as a defense against the payment of alimony,
the Defendant must have shown more than mere inaction or delay.
"In this case we have searched the record in vain
for any evidence which would even tend to show
that plaintiff misled defendant to his detriment,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-3Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In

or in any other way did anything to injure defendant, make it difficult or impossible for him to
c~mply with the order of the court, or persuaded
h~m not to apply to the court for reduction of
the award. The evidence adduced to the effect
that on the few occassions when he visited the
children and their mother in California, the
plaintiff did not harass him for payment
arrearages, ~s not sufficient .•. " (emphasis added)

or-

This court has uniformly held that there must be more than
mere silence over a period of time in order to raise an estoppel
which would protect the husband where a divorce decree orders
the payment of child support and alimony.

French v. Johnson,

16 Utah 2d. 360, 401 P2d 315 (1965) is A FORTIORI to the instant
case.

The facts as stated by this Court are that:
"On March 18, 1954, Johnson was ordered to
pay support money to his former wife for their
child. He defaulted, and in February, 1964,
10 years later, plaintiff brought proceedings
against him.
The district court relieved defendant of past
payments because the plaintiff had been dilatory
in requesting payments and producing her forwarding addresses to defendant.
Johnson defends by asserting estoppel or laches.
Defendant relied on his wife's silence."

Even though ten years had elapsed and Plaintiff may not have
produced her forwarding address to the Defendant this Court
held that:
"The facts show no representations, either
explicit or implicit, by plaintiff to defendant
with respect to discontinuation of payments
.
Mere silence over a period of time will not ralse
as estoppel. .. " (Id. p. 315)
In Baggs v. Andersen, 528 P2d 141, 143-144 (1974) the
holding of French v. Johnson, supra. was reaffirmed and the
duty of the Defendant-Respondent to prove more than mere sile~'
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or delay was again emphasized.
"An essential requirement is that there must
be some conduct of the obligee (plaintiff} , wh1ch
reasonabl~ induces the obligor (defendant) to rely
thereon and make some substantial change in his
pos1t1on to his detriment •.. This requirement
is not satisfied by the mere fact that he int'lulged
in the pleasant and emphoric assumption that he
would not have to meet his obligations ..• Likewise, the mere passage of time, or the failure of
a creditor (plaintiff£) to bedevil the debtor for
payment does not create an estoppel. (emphasis added)
The Trial Court's decision flies in the face of this Court's
previous rulings on the same subject.

Affirmation of the Trial

Court's decision would require this court to reverse itself in
each of the previously cited cases.

It would create a new

and separate duty to aggressively pursue alimony and child support
or risk losing those vested rights.

It would shift the duty to

collect support on the Plaintiff-Appellant.
This court should reverse the Trial Court's ruling and direct
that judgment be granted in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant and
against Defendant-Respondent in the amounts prayed for at the
hearing before the Trial Court.
POINT II
THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO PROTECT A PERSON FROM HIS OWN
MISTAKE OR INADVERTANCE.
It is an equitable principle that where one of two innocent
parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred
must bear it.

Pompton twp. v Cooper Union, 101

u.s.

196 (1879),

Orleans v. Platt, 99 U.S. 676 (1878), Magee v. Manhattan L. Ins.
Co., 92 c.s. 93 (1875), Gray v. Jacobsen, 56 App. DC 353, 13 F2d
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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959 (1926), Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P2d 1121
( 197 4) , Hanson v. Beehive Sec. Co., 14 Utah 2d 157, 3 80 P2d 66 (I
The Defendant-Respondent was present in court with his
attorney when the decree was last modified.

(T-10)

The Plaintif

appellant was not present nor represented by counsel.

(T-10)

De!·

endant-Respondent secured custody of his children and TTIOdified th
decree to eliminate his duty to pay child support.

(T-14)

1

Why

Defendant-Respondent neglected, omitted, or refused to further
modify the decree with regard to alimony is a rna tter of conjectur;
Whatever the reasons for Defendant-Respondent's failure to applp
the court for a modification of alimony, there is no justificatic:
which would allow him to invoke an equitable doctrine to remedy
or change his own error, inadvertance, or perhaps previous in tention.
The record clearly demonstrates that even if the Defendant·
Respondent in good faith believes that his alimony obligation
was terminated and therefore was an innocent party, nevertheless
it was through his agency that the loss occurred.

The Defendant·

Respondent understood his burden to proceed in order to obtain
custody of his children and in order to relieve himself of a
duty to pay child support.
expenses

inc~· d

ent to

·
meet~ng

He retained counsel and bore the 1~
th a t b ur d en.

He must have or shouli

have known that the burden to further modify the decree regardin'
alimony payments was also his burden.

Conversely, Plaintiff-

Appellant could not have been the party through whose agency t;.E
loss occurre d b ecause s h e was not even Present a t the time

wh~

or the place where,the decree was modified and the record is ck
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and undisputed that she made no representation either explicit or
implicit to the Defendant-Respondent with respect to discontinuation of payments.
This court should order that Defendant-Respondent must bear any
loss created by his own mistake or inadvertance.
POINT III
ALIMONY AWARDS MAY NOT BE RETROACTIVELY MODIFIED.
The method by which a party may be relieved of a duty to
pay support imposed by a divorce decree has been clearly defined.
There is no discretion left to attempt an alternate method.

Utah

Code Ann. §30-3-5 (1953) vests continuing jurisdiction in the
District Court of Utah:
" ..... to make such subsequent changes or new
orders with respect to the maintenance and
support of the parties .•. as shall be reasonable
and necessary ... "
Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P2d 233, 235-236 (1948)
emphasizes the absolute duty to apply to the court for relief from
an order of support in a divorce decree .
... no discretion is left to a divorced husband,
to determine whether he should or w~ll comply
with an alimon~ decree. So lo~g as such dec7ee
stands, it ~s ~ncumbent upon h~m to comply w~th
it, or at least to exercise every reasonable
effort to comply with it.
If because of change
in the circumstances of the parties it appears
that the decree is inequitable, or impossible to
comply with, he may petition for modification.
But so long as that decree stands, the husband
must comply wLth Lt, or make every reasonable
effort to do so, and this is true regardless of
how the financial situation of his former wife
may have improved.
(Emphasis added}
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Trial Court's ruling creates an alternate method of
modifying a divorce decree other than that prescribed by statute
and it has the effect of retroactively modifying the divorce
decree in this case.

Tnis is a result which this court has

specifically forbidden in Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P2d 1077, 1079
(1977)
In this jurisdiction alimony and support payments become unalterable debts as they accrue;
therefore, a periodic installment cannot be
changed or modified after the installments
have become due .•• (emphasis added)
In Larsen v. Larsen Id. this court again reaffirmed the metb
by which a decree can be modified.

The parties were free to make

application to the Court for a changed circumstances hearing.
This court refused to let the parties alter the decree by

~Y

other method.
The Trial Court has invoked an equitable doctrine to retroactively modify a divorce decree, a result specifically forbidder.
by this court, thereby protecting Defendant-Respondent from his
own mistake or inadvertance.

Such an application of equity is

itself inequitable and should not be allowed.
POINT IV
IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY A REDUCTION OF ALIMONY, THE
MOVING PARTY MUST PROVE CHANGED CONDITIONS ARISING
SINCE THE LAST MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE.

In Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P2d 419, 420 (19531
this court stated:
"It is well settled in this court that in order
to secure a change in a decree for alimony the
moving party must allege and prove changed conditions arising since the entry of the decree
which require, under rule of equity and JUSt~ce,
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a change in the decree, Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63
Utah, 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65
Utah, 261, 236 P. 457. 11 (emphasis added)
This statement was reaffirmed in Gardner v. Gardner, 111 Utah 286,
177 P2d 743 (1947) and again in Osmus v. Osmus supra.
The Trial Court used as its basis for finding a substantial
change in circumstances the fact that Plaintiff-Appellant no longer
had custody of the children and had no oligations for them (T.25)
The children of the parties were given to the Defendant-Respondent
at the time the decree was last modified in March of 1972.
modification left the alimony provision intact.

That

Since the Trial

Court must base its decision upon changed circumstances arising
since the entry of the decree it cannot use the fact that PlaintiffAppellant does not have custody of the children as a basis for
that modification.
The change in custody and therefore the change in circumstances
used by the Trial Court as a basis for modifying the decree was
created by the last modification of the decree.

Plaintiff-Appellant

submits that the Court must find a substantial change of circumstances excluding the fact that she no longer has custody of the
children of the parties, and that there was no showing at the hearing
below which would justify alimony being reduced to $1.00 per year.
Unless and until Defendant-Respondent can allege and prove a substantial change of circumstances arising since the last modification
of the decree in this case, the alimony award must remain undisturbed
and at its former level.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT V
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES BOTH ON THE APPEAL AND AT THE TRIAL BELOW.
The Trial Court's decision to estop Plaintiff-Appellant
from collecting past due alimony was patently erroneous.

There

was no evidence of any conduct on her part which would raise an

!
I

estoppel.

Both parties agree that Plaintiff-Appellant was silent!

with regard to her claims for alimony and that she made no repre·
sentations implicit or explicit to Defendant-Respondent which
would or could have induced him to rely to his detriment thereor..
The well established principals of equity provide that where one
of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the
loss occurred must bear it.

The Trial Court's decision ignores

the law clearly stated in Openshaw

V'.'

Openshaw supra., French v,

Johnson supra., and Baggs v. Andersen supra.
This court has held in Bates v. Bates, 560 P2d 706 (1977)
that when a party is compelled to appeal a patently erroneous
order, the party is entitled to attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
The law is well settled that mere silence on the part oft:
wife will not raise an estoppel which will bar

her claim for u:

paid alimony.
Neither should the doctrineof estoppel be used as a tool
to protect the party from his own mistake, inadvertance, or prE'
vious intention.
Divorce decrees can not be retroactively modified.
In order to secure a change in an alimony award, the movl:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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arising since the last modification of the divorce decree.
Attorney's fees are

~llowable

when a party is compelled to

appeal from a patently erroneous order.
For the foregoing reasons Appellant requests this Court to
reverse the decision of the Trial Court and instruct it to
enter the appropriate order.
Respectfully submitted this --------day of April, 1978.

c.

J. Jauss~
of the firm of
Mulliner, McCullough & Jaussi
424 South State Street
Orem, UT 84057
Attorney's for PlaintiffAppellant

I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant by delivering two copies thereof, to the office
Gary D. Stott, attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 350 East Center,
Provo, Utah 84601 this
day of April, 1978.
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